, I suggest in the second part of this paper that a good way to make sense of the German Court's strength is by understanding it as a reconciliation of two rather divergent ideas of law and authority: The first is transformative (or activist) constitutionalism. This is close to a model of constitutionalism we know from states such as South Africa or India -though my model is somewhat independent of the real-life examples -and, in terms of global constitutional history, a rather new thing. The second is comparatively old: a culture of authority that is hierarchically ordered and expertise-based. 6 In other words: A concept closely related to traditional continental understandings of law as well as Weberian concepts of rational authority. Fitting these two often divergent ideas of justice and authority together is the 4 MIRJAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986). 5 BRUCE ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984) . 6 DAMASKA, supra note 4, at 18 ff. the Nazi era, parliament could no longer be trusted to protect rights and so it was inevitable that a strong court would arise to play this role. Versions of this idea can for example be found on the first page of Kommers/Millers book on German constitutional jurisprudence 8 REV. 1971 REV. , 2003 REV. (2004 ( arguing that European internationalism constituted a reaction to bad experiences with both nationalism and democracy (since Hitler and Mussolini were both elected leaders) and that current international institutions are for this reason both antinationalist and antidemocratic).
who argues that the German Court's strength stems from its ability "to participate in shaping the collective memory about the previous regime(s) of horror" 11 .
All of these accounts contain important insights. Yet the emphasis on the Nazi past suggests not only a skewed historical account, but also cannot explain the framers' disinterest in constitutional review. Nor, ultimately, can it account for the Court's authority and the bulk of its expansive jurisprudence today.
The Nazi past
For one thing, the historical events during the Nazi regime hardly serve as an argument for a strong judiciary and a weak German parliament. The legal profession participated considerably in the administration of Nazi injustice inside the administration, the academy and the judiciary. Nine out of the fifteen participants in the infamous Wannsee conference, which organized the deportation and systematic mass murder of European Jews in Eastern European concentration camps, were lawyers. 12 In the academy, influential scholars like Carl Schmitt and Karl Larenz developed interpretative strategies of "concrete order thinking" (konkretes Ordnungsdenken) that allowed lawyers to transgress the boundaries of traditional legal doctrines as a means of adapting existing 10 Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, VIRGINIA L.REV. 771(1997), 779-780 (arguing that the Constitutional Court enjoyed special legitimacy because the judges were, unlike other parts of the German government, not former Nazi collaborateurs enforce them. 22 At the same time, they couldn't agree as to which courts would enforce these rights and refused to provide for the institutional complaint mechanism (today responsible for 95 % of all cases) in the constitution, 23 fearing a "juridification" of 19 Id., at 57. 20 Id., at 52 ff. 21 (1993) . 23 The constitutional complaint mechanism was only established subsequently (initially) on a merely statutory basis, mostly with the support of Social Democrats. This was changed later in a constitutional amendment, adding Art. 93 para. 1 Nr. 4a GG to the Basic Law in 1969.
politics. 24 Indeed, they generally worried about granting courts too much power. 25 Mostly, however, they were concerned with questions of institutional design:
How to build the new state and its institutions in a way less susceptible to authoritarian take-over than the Weimar Republic? For this purpose, the framers declared in the so- Relying on the Nazi thesis, we would also expect to see the Court more often and more strongly play the role of a guardian against what went wrong in the Nazi era, for example by focusing on the rights of minorities or by opposing nationalist policies and favoring internationalism. But this is not what has happened, and that should prompt us to think further.
To begin with, human dignity, the supposed symbol of the "never-again" theme in the Basic Law, is both a less important and a more ambiguous concept in German constitutional law than the Nazi thesis implies. 33 39 The Christian post-war use of dignity officially replaced that basis for equal recognition with God or, in a more secularized version, with the Constitution, thus extending it to all humans. 40 The difference between the Nazi era and the postwar conception of dignity is thus not an absolute one, but rather one of scope. Important parts of German dignity jurisprudence such as privacy rights thus do not so much reflect anti-Nazi ideas as a more longstanding social status idea.
Nor has the Court really assumed the role of staunch guardian of politically vulnerable minority rights which the anti-Nazi idea would imply. Of course, the German Court protects politically vulnerable groups, but like other courts, only some of the time. This analysis reflects the obvious fact that courts do many things and so the Nazi thesis will almost by definition fail to speak at all to very important aspects of the Court's work. This alone should warn us against placing too much reliance on it. But the cases also show, in line with the more general arguments made in this section, how imperfectly the thesis speaks to the Court's activity even in the cases to whose subject matter it should have some relevance. sentiment of anti-politics in the larger German public, the Justices hence were not likely to share it. Rather, they, too, wanted to contribute to the building of a new Germany state and society -together with the government and legislators. Here, then, is the riddle: What therefore was it that led the German Court ultimately to develop the strong and often counter-majoritarian rights jurisprudence it is so famous for today?
4. Transitions

Comparisons
The beginnings of an answer lie in examining the deeper legal culture in which the German Constitutional Court found itself operating. To do so, we need to take a step back 73 and look at the German Court from some distance. From further away, will we begin to see the contours of a new picture emerging. To get a better sense of it, our inquiry must be both wide-ranging and deep: How citizens understand the state and law -whether they think that all government is inherently oppressive or believe that the state is a good thing and law is its best and most important tool to realize a better world -will influence the role of courts in a society. Nor should we confine ourselves to looking at constitutional courts merely as strategic actors seeking to carve out a maximum of power for themselves in a larger institutional context, thus isolating them from their legal tradition and their broader cultural context. Justices at constitutional courts are first and foremost educated in, work in, and socialized into a legal system for decades before their appointment to the court. Unsurprisingly, they will be influenced by their specific legal culture, and by the more general attitudes towards authority in society.
Against this broader backdrop, we can start to recognize similarities between the constitutional jurisprudence of Germany and other countries where we might not have suspected them, such as in India or South Africa. Germans share with countries like these the idea that the state has to play an important role in shaping society. All of these states moreover understand their constitutions as giving expression to some greater, comprehensive idea of justice. Conversely, other jurisdictions, which Germans assume to be familiar, such as the United States, suddenly appear strange, their constitutional law oddly outdated. We discover another group of family resemblances with many of Germany's European neighbors. Like Germans, they organize the exercise of state authority in hierarchical structures and entrust highly specialized administrative tasks to professionals who will usually be career bureaucrats. In such systems, law is treated as a science and the performance of legal tasks requires long and intensive periods of study and training. As a result, the division between law and other disciplines is a self-evident truth and a key tenet of the professional self-understanding of lawyers. parties. Finally, the interpretation of an activist constitution will usually be substancedriven and require considerable flexibility. Since its most important goal is to realize its vision of justice, it matters little who or what institution carries out the relevant tasks as long as the envisaged goal is ultimately achieved in a satisfying and efficient way.
Hierarchical and coordinate authority 82
81 Note that Damaska's original conception of activist statehood does not encompass the concept of individual rights, for more see DAMASKA, supra note 4, at 32. 82 The following two paragraphs provide a rough summary of Damaska's concept of hierarchical and coordinate authority, Id., see DAMASKA supra note 4, at 16 ff. with some illustrations added by the present author.
Our second variable is concerned with the reasons why citizens accept the authority of state institutions and the judiciary in particular. In a hierarchical system, authority is organized in hierarchical structures and exercised by a professional, in Weberian terms rational, bureaucracy. 83 While there may exist some higher source of legitimacy at the very top (god, the king, the people), official institutions' primary claim to authority rests on their professionalism and expertise guaranteeing efficiency and thus ultimately good results. The principle of separation of powers operates in this system not as a safeguard against concentrations of power, but rather as a tool for the rational ordering of the state in order to increase efficiency. When trained bureaucrats perform their functions, they act in the name of the institution, not their own individual personalities. Courts, too, will deliberate secretly, dissents will be prohibited and decisions will be presented to the public as those of the court rather than mere majority opinions. Specialization and the division of functions will furthermore produce more technical rules of decision-making divorced from the common-sense pragmatism of the well-socialized layman prevalent in common law systems. Law is considered a science whose mastery requires considerable effort. Arbitrariness and inconsistencies threaten the claim to judicial authority. In order to avoid them, lawyers, scholars and judges work towards constructing law as a logically consistent, gapless system of norms. The imperative of upholding its integrity prevails over case-to-case considerations of what seems right in individual disputes.
In contrast, in a coordinate system authority is not exercised on the basis of a strict separation of functions, but instead often shared among several officials or institutions whose functions are not strictly delimited. functions, such as in the federal agencies of the post-New-Deal period in the US, their competences tend to be subjected to some mechanism of surveillance, preferably one that brings the society and the people back into the administrative process, such as the notice and comment procedure for rulemaking. Consequently, the idea that decision-makers
give up their social/private personality when they become part of the administration of justice is seen as undesirable and contrary to the dignity of officials. Standards for decision-making cannot be separated from the prevailing social norms and expectations or -in some cases -the elites' idea of justice.
Beyond Anti-Nazism
Transformations
Transformative constitutionalism, originally developed in the South African context, is often considered a typical hallmark of the Global South. It may thus be startling for me to describe German constitutionalism as transformative. But at the core of transformative constitutionalism is the idea that we must change. 84 This is, by no means, a vision unique to the Global South. The idea of change entails that government must be a main agent in this change, but also that the constitution itself must guide and steer our efforts to change.
Transformative constitutionalism is often present in transitions, but it can outlast them. 
Consolidation
Once the Court had lost its public image as progressive frontrunner, it could no longer credibly invoke the need for change to justify the expansion of its authority. Its appeared and still appears to some as the only "legal" conception -merely because it is familiar and already elaborated by doctrinal scholars and courts. 94 It thus provided the basis for an enduring misunderstanding that led scholars to denounce activist law as 'political' and 'non-legal'. As with most myths, this one has a kernel of truth in it, too.
Transformative constitutionalism constantly produces many new questions: Compared to a social utopia, real society will necessarily always appear lacking and therefore change indispensable. This is perhaps best illustrated by India, where law has become more than anywhere else a tool for social upliftment -an idea hard to reconcile with legal certainty and determinacy. There is always so much new work to be done in order to realize the unreachable constitutional ideal, so it is difficult to establish consistent a priori standards 91 and open to policy arguments (political) and others simultaneously as formalist, dry and technical (legal). It is indeed all of these things -and it must be in order to strike the balance between the conflicting demands of hierarchical authority and an activist paradigm of constitutional law. This style, though not necessarily unique, distinguishes it from many other renowned courts around the world, such as the South African Constitutional Court, the Indian and -perhaps most clearly -the US Supreme Court.
One of the most important doctrinal tools allowing the German Court to tackle the challenge of reconciling transformative constitutionalism with a hierarchical culture of authority is proportionality analysis. Though by now widespread, it is no accident that proportionality emerged first in German constitutional law. One of the first times the Court employed balancing, one of proportionality's steps, was in Lüth, where it balanced Lüth's freedom of speech and the economic and professional interests of Harlan and his film producers. Not only did proportionality analysis develop in Germany, but it also has a distinctive, often more formal structure than proportionality analysis elsewhere. This structure is congenial to its German double purpose: On one hand, proportionality allows courts to address the concrete facts of a case in a more explicit and detailed way in the legal analysis, thus opening it up to a variant of different considerations and providing the necessary flexibility to deal with a wide range of questions. But at the same time, it conveys an illusion of legal certainty and judicial determinacy, suggesting that "it is not the law that varies from case to case, but the facts or decision-making context"
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. These are valuable properties for any court -hence proportionality's global popularity -but they take on an especially valuable complexion against the backdrop of German legal culture. The individual steps of its framework have in Germany been filled in with rightsspecific doctrinalization, and sometimes even been accompanied by a set of sub-rules, that re-formalize the legal analysis.
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The formalization of value jurisprudence also meant that constitutional law remained part of the continental scientific approach to law and its own discipline, distinct from politics. Protecting this legal autonomy implies first of all the protection of legal boundaries. While German law is relatively open to a wide variety of arguments through its method of objective (teleological) interpretation or within the proportionality framework, it remains key to keep law distinct from other disciplines as well as politics.
Even though German lawyers are well aware of the indeterminacy of law, German scholars nevertheless tend to remain constructive in their approach to legal scholarship, as Joseph Weiler noted at the end of the German Public Law Symposium at NYU this paper was a part of. And indeed, rather than investigating extra-legal influences on law, hierarchical position based on its expertise in interpreting the constitutional text. 119 From the internal legal perspective the Court inhabits, no more can be said than that the Court is interpreting a text as it is being called upon to do. This approach goes with a lack of institutionalized self-reflection that contributes to its expansive jurisprudence.
Conclusion
Why does it matter what basis the German Court's authority really relies on? The answer is that any evaluation or critique presupposes that we understand what is going on. If the Nazi thesis were correct, then we might for example simply point out that Germany democracy has matured and generally takes rights quite seriously and so there is no need for a Court as a strong guardian anymore. This argument is, however, likely to fall flat as the Court's current strength has little to do with the Nazi past anymore -as we have seen, this past mostly mattered during the first years of transition and did not serve even then to produce a counter-majoritarian kind of judicial activism. Understanding that the deeper basis of the German Court's legitimacy lies in the German hierarchical legal culture is therefore a condition for a more nuanced and realistic assessment. And there are indeed costs attached to the German model of constitutionalism that do not always receive the attention they deserve in current discourse. While the Court's increasing popularity and importance means that today every citizens knows that she can appeal to the Court (the famous 'walk to Karlsruhe') 120 and assert her rights against a once mighty state - 
